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abStract
This paper provides a preliminary analysis of the variegated extent of fi-
nancialisation of European economies since circa 1980. For this purpose, the 
broad characterisation of financialisation offered by Fine (2012) is adopted. 
This characterisation identifies eight features of the financialisation process. 
We focus in particular on the size of the financial sector within a selection of 
European economies. Data show that the financialisation process is not re-
flected in the share of employment in the financial sector. This is likely to be 
the result of the labour-saving nature of technological and organisational inno-
vations introduced in the financial sector in the last two decades. By contrast, 
the increasing weight of finance in the economy is reflected in the ratio of the 
value added of the financial sector to total value added and by the ratio of the 
value of financial assets to GDP. Overall, we find that most European countries 
have undergone a process of financialisation in the last three decades. How-
ever, this process has been variegated, leading us to coin the term ‘variegated 
financialisation’. The variegation of the financialisation process is likely to be 
explained by differences in economic and social structures between nations, 
regions and systems. 
Keywords: Financial Crises; Government Policy and Regulation of Financial 
Markets; Financial Institutions; Varieties of Capitalism; Variegated Financialisation. 
reSumen
Este artículo proporciona un análisis preliminar del heterogéneo proceso 
de financiarización acontecido en las economías europeas desde 1980. Para 
ello, se adopta el enfoque amplio de financiarización definido por Fine (2012) 
que identifica ocho elementos significativos en dicho proceso; más concreta-
mente, nos centramos en el análisis del tamaño del sector financiero en una 
selección de países europeos. Los datos muestran que el proceso de financi-
arización no se manifiesta en términos del crecimiento del empleo en el sector 
financiero, probablemente como consecuencia de la naturaleza ‘ahorradora 
de empleo’ de las innovaciones organizativas y tecnológicas introducidas en 
el sector en las dos últimas décadas. Por contra, la creciente participación de 
lo financiero en la economía sí se hace patente en la ratio valor añadido del 
sector financiero sobre valor añadido total y en el cociente entre el valor de 
los activos financieros y el PIB. En términos generales, encontramos evidencia 
de que en la mayoría de las economías europeas estudiadas ha tenido lugar 
un proceso de financiarización a lo largo de las tres últimas décadas, pero que 
dicho proceso se ha desarrollado de manera muy diversa, lo que nos lleva a 
acuñar el término “financiarización heterogénea” (variegated financialisation). 
Este proceso de financiarización diferencial se explica por las diferencias en 
las estructuras económicas y sociales entre los diferentes países, regiones y 
sistemas.
Palabras clave: crisis financieras; política gubernamental y regulación de 
los mercados.
JEL-Classification: G01, G18, G21, N20.
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1. introduction
This paper provides a preliminary analysis of the variegated extent of fi-
nancialisation focusing on European countries since circa 1980. It does so by 
drawing on and synthesising data contained mainly in the country reports pro-
duced as part of Work Package 2 in the FESSUD project.1 OECD and Eurostat 
statistics are also used to facilitate cross-country comparison. 
The term ‘financialisation’ originates in non-mainstream economics. That 
term aims to address in an interdisciplinary and open way important social 
and economic changes that have occurred in the last three decades. There are 
several features which distinguish the era of financialisation. While capitalist 
economies have always relied heavily on finance, what is distinctive about the 
present era is the deepening and broadening of financial motives, financial 
markets, and financial institutions within capitalist economies (for discussions 
on financialisation see, among others, Epstein 2005, Hein 2010, Fine 2009, 
and Erturk et al. 2008, IJPE 2013). These changes have occurred through the 
globalisation of capital flows, the shareholder value revolution, and the rise of 
incomes from financial investment (Stockhammer 2004).
The paper is organised as follows. First, a broad characterisation of finan-
cialisation is presented. Here we draw on the work of Fine (2012), and explain 
why our examination is preliminary but necessary in light of debates in the 
financialisation literature. Second, the cross-country trend in the employment 
share of the financial sector is discussed. We argue that usually financialisa-
tion does not involve an increase in the employment share of banks and other 
financial institutions, due to the increasing technology intensity of financial 
activities. Recent financial crises have also had a negative, but country-specific, 
impact on the employment level in the financial sector. Section 4 deals with 
the gross value added of the financial sector. We show that the latter has in-
creased across EU countries in the last decades. However, differences between 
countries are at least as apparent as similarities. Whereas the UK is the finan-
cial core of Europe, the manufacturing sector is still somewhat dominant in 
Germany. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of the cross-country trend in the 
value of financial assets. The latter has grown in most EU countries in the last 
1FESSUD stands for ‘Financialisation, Economy, Society, and Sustainable Development’. It is a 
multidisciplinary, pluralistic project which aims to forge alliances across the social sciences, so as to 
understand how finance can better serve economic, social and environmental needs. We refer the 
reader to FESSUD website: http://fessud.eu/
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decades. This is the most eye-catching feature of financialisation. Finally, sec-
tion 6 offers some broad conclusions and reflections. We argue that, while the 
increasing weight of financial motives, financial markets and financial institu-
tions is apparent in most EU countries, financialisation should be regarded as 
a geographically and temporally variegated process.
2. deFininG FinancialiSation2
Fine (2012) identifies eight features which mark the process of financialisa-
tion of capitalist economies in the last thirty years. First, financialisation refers 
to the worldwide expansion and proliferation of financial markets, institutions, 
and assets since the mid-1980s. As we will show, this is reflected in the rise 
of both the value added share of the financial sector and the ratio of financial 
assets to GDP (e.g. Blankenberg and Palma 2009). Financialisation has been 
driven by ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries, with the United States having the predomi-
nant role, but European countries have also been affected by the increasing 
dominance of finance. The equity to GDP ratio for the Euro Area rose from 
8% in 1980 to 82% in 2006.3 Similarly, private debt securities, government 
debt securities, and bank deposits ratios to GDP rose from 14% to 114%, 
from 13% to 61%, and from 43% to 99%, respectively over the same period 
(e.g. Frangakis 2009: 59). Second, financialisation has gone along with the de-
regulation (and re-regulation) of the financial system and the liberalisation of 
goods, capital and labour markets. Third, financialisation has been associated 
with the implementation of a multitude of new financial activities and products, 
including subprime mortgages, derivatives, and over-the-counter securities. 
Fourth, financialisation has been reflected in the progressive dominance of the 
finance sector over the manufacturing sector. The point is that large corpora-
tions, including non-financial ones, have increasingly derived profitability from 
financial (as opposed to productive) business, especially in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. The pursuit of shareholder value in the short run has affected nega-
tively long-run productive investment and the accumulation of fixed capital 
in early-industrialised economies. Fifth, financialisation is associated with the 
increasing reliance of governments, firms and households on market coordina-
tion mechanisms, as well as the rising inequality of incomes and wealth distri-
bution (e.g. OECD 2008, 2011a,b; Piketty and Saez 2003, 2006). The decline 
or stagnation of real wages, coupled with austere fiscal policies implemented 
by national governments, have ended up affecting aggregate demand. This, in 
turn, has led to an increasing demand for consumer credit to preserve real con-
sumption levels. The sharp rise in household debt has been fostered also by a 
Veblenian ‘conspicuous consumption’ due to increasing inequality. Sixth, cred-
2  This section is based on FESSUD Description of Work, Part B (see FESSUD 2011, pp. 3-4).
3 In this document, the official term ‘Euro Area’ is preferred to other informal definitions, such as 
‘Eurozone’. 
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it-led consumption has been fed further by the use of capital gains in housing 
as collateral. At the international level, the rising “twin deficits” of the United 
States (meaning the deficit in the US government budget coupled with the defi-
cit in the current account of the balance of payments) has been matched by a 
corresponding rising holding of assets denominated in US dollars as reserves 
by other countries. It can be noted that the removal of capital controls has 
compelled developing countries to accumulate large amounts of foreign cur-
rency reserves to offset possible speculative attacks against their own currency 
and financial instability. However, this has reduced the capacity of their govern-
ments to pursue developmental policies. Seventh, finance has penetrated into 
a widening range of social spheres, including housing, pensions, health, and 
the environment – think, for example, of the trading of carbon permits and the 
privatisation of national pension systems. Finally, financialisation is associated 
with a specific culture, in particular, a culture of reliance upon the market and 
the use of the state merely as an agent of last resort (FESSUD 2011, p. 4).
All in all, Fine’s eight-fold characterisation stresses the co-development of 
different – though interconnected – aspects of financialisation.4 Financialisa-
tion spans the single global system but is highly variegated in nature, impact 
and response across regions and scales. Accordingly, nation states cannot be 
categorised into ‘types’ of capitalism nor into ‘types’ of financialisation (nor can 
Europe as a whole). Thus in what follows our sample of countries is not strictly 
fixed as would be required if we believed such types existed and our purpose 
were categorisation into types.5 Instead, the aim of the paper is to make a 
preliminary quantitative examination of the complex variegation of the finan-
cialisation of the capitalist system as manifest in Europe; ‘preliminary’ in the 
simple sense that the word limit allows us to cover only the first and fourth of 
Fine’s eight features of financialisation (sufficient to make clear the complexity 
and quantitative variegation of financialisation as regards these two features); 
also, ‘preliminary’ in being mainly quantitative and restricted to national level 
data. Though preliminary, the analysis provides a context and orientation for 
more detailed and multi-level analysis such as that found across the FESSUD 
project. Borrowing from FESSUD country reports, we examine three quantita-
tive dimensions of the process of financialisation: employment, value added, 
and financial asset value. We begin with the consideration of the employment 
share accounted for by the financial sector. 
4 A concept which is strictly linked to that of financialisation is the concept of ‘financial integration’. 
This latter term refers to the increasing (asymmetrical) cross-border interconnection of banking 
systems and financial markets, involving the strengthening of debit/credit relationships among 
economic units which are located in different geographical areas (see Veronese Passarella, 2015).
5 Data unavailability in any case precludes a fixed sample of European countries. For comparison and 
context, the US and Japan are also included in the analysis.
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3. employment in the Financial Sector
Using a broad definition of finance (encompassing real estate, rental and 
business activity), the share of employment in the financial sector has grown 
in all the selected countries since the early-1990s.6 Not surprisingly, the ‘Ben-
elux’ and the UK are the economies with the highest employment share in 
finance (all above 20% since the mid-2000s), followed by France and the US 
(see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Interestingly enough, Germany’s share of employ-
ees in the financial sector is rather high too. Italy represents a sort of middle-
ground (around 15% in 2010), whereas the other Mediterranean countries 
and the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs hereafter) still show a 
lower share of employment in the broadly-defined financial sector. The situa-
tion is reversed if we focus on recent years. Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, 
and Slovakia are the countries in which employment in the financial sector has 
been growing rapidly since 1995.7 By contrast, early-financialised European 
economies (along with Portugal) are those in which that the employment share 
of finance has been growing slowly.
FiGure 1: employment in Financial intermediation, real eState, rental and buSineSS activitieS (% 
to total)
Source: Our elaboration on OECD statistics (February 2012).
6 Outside Europe, a major exception is Japan, which is the country with the lowest employment in the 
financial sector. The employment share is 4.73% in 1995 and decreases in the subsequent years, 
falling to 4.42% in 2008 (see Figure 1).
7 In some countries, this happens in spite of the negative trend in total employment. For instance, in 
Estonia total employment decreases by 16% over the period of 1989-2003 (-60% in manufacturing), 
whereas employment in financial intermediation doubles (see Juuse and Kattel 2013: 12).
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FiGure 2: employment in Financial intermediation, real eState, rental and buSineSS activitieS (index 
1995=100)
Source: Our elaboration on OECD statistics (February 2012).
However, if one uses a narrower definition of ‘financial sector’, no clear 
trend in the employment share shows up. For instance, the broadly-defined 
financial sector is one of the largest employers in the French private sector (see 
Blot et al. 2013: 30-32). But if one excludes real estate, rental and business 
activity, the share of finance in total employment turns out to be rather low and 
stable (in the range of 1.6-1.8%) since the mid-1990s. Similarly, in Germany 
the share of employment in the narrowly-defined financial sector fluctuates in 
the range of 1.5%-2.2% since the 1990s and is even decreasing.8 In Italy, the 
maximum percentage of employees in the monetary and financial services sec-
tor reaches 2.78% in 1994 and decreases to 2.57% in 2010 (see Consolandi 
et al. 2013: 25-26).9 In Spain, the share of employment in the financial sector 
is rather stable (around the figure of 2.5% of total employment in the last dec-
ade). In Portugal, financial activities register a marginal decrease in importance 
in terms of employment (from 3.1% in 1995 to 3.0% in 2011), even though 
the employment share of the financial sector in the broad sense is relatively 
stable (Lagoa et al. 2013: 30-32). In Greece, the total number of employees in 
the financial sector increases until 2009 and then reverses, whereas the share 
8 If one includes also insurance services, employment in German financial sector increases from about 
2.6% in 1970 to almost 3.5% in the 1990s, and then decreases to 3% of total employment in 2008-
2010 (see Detzer et al. 2013: 19). As for the absolute level of employment, it remains stable for the 
most part of 1990s and decreases during the 2000s (Ibidem: 56).
9 Overall, the employment in the Italian services sector has recorded a noteworthy growth since the 
1980s: from 48% of total employment in 1980 to 68% in 2009, with a rate of growth of 41% (see 
Consolandi et al. 2013: 25-26).
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of total employment starts to decline earlier (from 2.29% in 1995 to 2.53% in 
2000 and then to 2.35% in 2009).10
Among the major EU economies, the UK is the only one in which the fi-
nancial sector has kept on growing, though not dramatically.11 It appears that 
Sweden has followed a similar trend.12 There is some evidence of an increasing 
weight of the financial sector as employer in the CEECs as well. For instance, 
Hungary’s and Poland’s shares of employment in finance have expanded grad-
ually even in recent years, despite rather unfavourable conditions in labour 
markets (see Alfred et al. 2013: 8, 26; and Szikszai et al. 2013: 46).13 
Summing up, the process of financialisation of EU countries is not uni-
vocally reflected in their shares of employees in the financial sector. CEECs 
(Poland, Hungary and Estonia, in particular) are catching up with other Eu-
ropean economies. CEECs share of employees in the financial sector is still 
comparatively low, but has grown faster in the last two decades. As one would 
expect, the UK is marked by a high share of employees in the financial sector. 
However, the recent trend is rather flat. France shows a similar pattern for the 
broadly-defined financial sector, but the narrowly-defined financial sector has 
remained relatively small. Similarly, the share of employees in the narrowly-de-
fined financial sector has remained rather low in the Mediterranean countries 
(Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal), with a predominance of employees in the 
banking sector. Northern European countries as a whole have not recorded sig-
nificant increases in employment, but they usually started from very high initial 
absolute percentages of employment in financial activities. All in all, the trend 
in the number of employees in the financial sector to total employment ratio 
does not capture (entirely) the role and impact of financialisation in European 
economies. Leaving aside the effects of the crises of 2001 and 2007-2008, 
one reason for the above trends is that banking and financial sectors have ex-
perienced a switch of ‘orientation from labour intensive to technology intensive 
driven by the introduction and development of automatic teller machines, cash 
dispensers, point of sales, phone banking, remote banking, TV banking, inter-
net banking, where a large number of employees have been transferred from 
financial divisions to outsourcing and/or off-shoring companies’ (Consolandi et 
al. 2013: 25-26). Jobs in the financial sector, in short, have been lost due to 
technological progress.
 
10 According to Argitis and Michopoulou (2013: 29-32), ‘the fall in employment after the onset 
of the sovereign debt crisis is due [also] to the will of some employees to be retired before the 
materialization of significant reforms to country’s pension system’.
11Employment in FIRE sector (i.e. broadly-defined financial sector minus rental and business activities) 
grows from 1.0 million in 1980 to 1.6 million in 2010, and from 3.9% of UK employees to 5.0% of 
employees in the same period (see Shabani et al. 2015: 40).
12 The share of employment in financial sector to total employment grows from around 6.5% in 1980 
to almost 16% in 2010 (see Stenfors et al. 2014: 47; see also Stenfors 2014).
13 Interestingly enough, Poland’s employment in financial sector increases even during the global 
financial crisis of 2008-2010, whereas in the overall economy the unemployment rate rises by about 
3 percentage points (see Alfred et al. 2013: 8, 26).
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Notice that banks are usually the main job provider within the narrowly-
defined financial sector. For instance, banks currently provide 70% of total em-
ployment in Greece and 90% in France (where this percentage has increased 
in the last two decades, see Blot et al. 2013: 30-32). By contrast, in other 
countries there has been a different re-composition among the financial sub-
sectors. For example, in Spain the banking sub-sector has lost relative size in 
the last decades, whereas both the insurance and pension funds and the aux-
iliary activities have gained in size, ‘although in both sub-sectors their shares in 
total employment remain below the figure of 1 percent’ (Altuzarra et al. 2013: 
61-62).14 In many countries, such as the UK, the rise in employment within 
the financial sector has not been as dramatic as the relative growth of this 
sector’s balance sheet. The point is that what matters (to measure the degree 
of financialisation) is ‘not just the number of employees but their remunera-
tion, the relative worth of the work done in this sector and its relationship to 
inequality within the economy’ (Shabani et al. 2015: 40-41). In other words, 
the dramatic growth in the financial sector is mainly reflected in the value of 
financial assets and liabilities relative to GDP, whose creation and trading is not 
labour intensive.
4. value added oF the Financial Sector
In spite of the flat trend in the employment share, the increase in the share 
of value added of the financial sector (to the economy-wide value added) has 
generally been quite remarkable15. This inter alia suggests that the labour pro-
ductivity of employees in the financial sector ‘has grown faster than the aver-
age’ (Lagoa et al. 2013: 31), in most of the considered countries. National 
growth rates of financial sector’s value added have been rather variegated 
though, both across countries and across periods. This uneven trend can be 
seen by splitting the last two decades into four subsets.
First period (1990-1994). Northern European countries (such as ‘Benelux’, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Germany) are those in which the value added of fi-
nance, insurance and business services grew more rapidly in the early 1990s, 
with an average growth rate of between 3.07% in Germany and 4.36% in Bel-
gium (see Figure 3.A). The UK and the US, along with Norway and Italy, record 
positive growth rates (higher than 2% on average), whereas France and Spain 
record null and negative growth rates, respectively.
14 This re-composition process becomes clearer insofar as one looks ‘at the share of the three financial 
sub-sectors in the total employment of the financial sector. Since the late eighties, the financial 
services sub-sector is losing weight (-17.2 percentage points between 1987Q2 and 2012Q1) 
in favour of employment in the insurance and pension funds (+10.4 percentage points) and the 
auxiliary activities (+ 6.8 percentage points)’ (see Altuzarra et al. 2013: 61-62).
15 Notice that this is ‘value added’ in the national accounts sense, i.e. as a contribution to GDP. 
However, it should neither be inferred that the financial sector is ‘valuable’ nor that it creates 
(macroeconomic) value.
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FiGure 3.a: national Growth rateS in Financial Sector’S value added acroSS countrieS and periodS 
(%).
Source: Our elaboration on OECD statistics (September 2013).
Notes: Finance, insurance and business services; Germany from 1992; Sweden only 1994; Czech 
Republic, Greece and Poland from 1996; France, Poland and the UK until 2009.
Second period (1995-1999). This period approximately corresponds to 
the so-called ‘New Economy’ era and is marked by an overall and remarkable 
increase in the value added of the financial sector. Each and every country 
considered records an average growth rate in the financial sector’s value added 
that was higher than 2%, and the overall average was above 5%. Once again, 
the Benelux countries and the UK, along with Austria, show very high growth 
rates. Finland, Greece, and Poland also record high growth rates. Interestingly 
enough, the three major Continental European economies (notably Germany, 
France and Italy) show, in contrast, quite flat growth rates in the value added of 
the financial sector across this period.
Third period (2000-2004). This period roughly covers the crisis of the New 
Economy. This is reflected in the overall average rate of growth of the financial 
sector value added, which is two points below that of the previous 5-year pe-
 
 
15 
 
FIGURE 3.A. National growth rates in financial sector’s value added across countries 
and periods (%). 
 
Source: our elaboration on OECD statistics (September 2013). 
Notes: finance, insurance and business services; Germany from 1992; Sweden only 1994; Czech 
Republic, Greece and Poland from 1996; France, Poland and the UK until 2009. 
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riod (though one point above that of 1990-1994). Spain is the only country 
in which value added increases in 2000-2004 (5.64% compared to 3.58% in 
1995-1999 and -0.42% in 1990-1994). The UK, Austria, and Denmark re-
cord the highest growth rates after Spain. No country records negative average 
growth rates in 2000-2004, even though Italy’s and Germany’s growth rates of 
the financial sector’s value added are close to zero.
Fourth period (2005-2009). The first part of this period (2005-2007) is 
marked by a generalised boom in financial activities, but the boom is followed 
by a sharp fall in 2008-2009, affecting in particular Northern European econo-
mies.
Looking at the whole 20-year period, Italy turns out to be the country with 
the lowest growth rate in the financial sector’s value added, and it is closely fol-
lowed by the other two major economies of Continental Europe (Germany and 
France) and by Finland. By contrast, Poland is the country in which the growth 
of the financial sector’s value added has been the most rapid.16 The UK and 
Benelux, along with Greece, record high growth rates as well (see Figure 3.B).
FiGure 3.b: averaGe Growth rateS oF Financial Sector’S value added in a number oF Selected 
countrieS, 1990-2009 (%).
Source: Our elaboration on OECD statistics (September 2013).
Notes: Finance, insurance and business services; Germany from 1992; Sweden only 1994; Czech 
Republic, Greece and Poland from 1996; France, Poland and the UK until 2009.
16 Notice that this impetuous growth did not involve each and every CAEE economy. For instance, ‘the 
contribution of financial intermediation to the Estonian economy in relative terms has been stable 
throughout the years. Even during the boom period between 2004 and 2008, financial services 
contributed around 4% to Estonia’s gross value added’ (see Juuse and Kattel 2013).
 
 
16 
 
FIGURE 3.B. Average growth rates of financial sector’s value added in a number of 
selected countries, 1990-2009 (%). 
 
 
Source: our elaboration on OECD statistics (September 2013). 
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Notice that the share of ‘financial’ value added remains almost unchanged 
(though with quite large short-term fluctuations) in two major economies of the 
EU, namely Germany and France, since the 1980s. More precisely, the value 
added of French financial and insurance companies represents almost 5% of 
French GDP in 2011. This value corresponds to the peak of the late 1980s, 
when it shifts upwards because of the deregulation impetus. However, it de-
clines ‘after each economic and/or financial crisis: 1993, 2001 and 2008’. As 
a result, it remains ‘between 4 and 5% from the 1980s onwards’ (Blot et al. 
2013: 30-31). Similarly, in Germany the financial sector’s share in value added 
registers ‘modest increases’ from 1970 to 1980, whereas it remains ‘relatively 
stable’ from 1980 until 2012 (Detzer et al. 2013: 19).17 As for the other major 
EU countries, Italy is marked by a similar trend compared to Germany, whereas 
the growth in value added of finance in the UK is much more apparent. More 
precisely, the Italian financial sector’s average share of value added (to total 
value added) is 4.47% until the early 2000s.18 By contrast, the UK is the coun-
try in which the value added of the financial sector has grown faster in the last 
thirty years. Indeed it grows ‘at more than twice the rate of the economy as a 
whole’ (see Shabani et al. 2015: 177). Notice, however, that the US and the 
Netherlands record even higher growth rates in the financial sector’s share of 
value added (see Philippon and Reshef 2013: 80).
Turning to late-industrialized European economies, both Greece and Por-
tugal have faced a rapid catching-up process, and the same is the case for a 
number of CEECs. The Spanish case is less clear, however.19 The financial sector 
in Greece is dominated by banks.20 The Greek financial sector expands ‘from 
3.8% of GDP in 1995 to 4.9% of GDP in 2009’ (Argitis and Michopoulou 
2013: 27), thereby recording an increase of almost 29%. In Portugal, the value 
added of the financial sector (including the real estate sector) relative to total 
value added grew from 10% in 1986 to 15% in 2010. Notice that ‘in 1995 the 
Portuguese financial sector was one of the smallest. However, from 1995 to 
2011 the relevance of the financial sector in the overall GDP has grown faster 
in Portugal than in the Euro Area, with its pace of growth being only supplanted 
by Ireland’s’. However, when the narrowly-defined financial sector is taken into 
17 More precisely, ‘[s]tarting with a share of 3.5% in 1970, the contribution of the financial sector 
(i.e. financial and insurance services) increased to 4.5% by 1980. Thereafter, a structural shift is not 
apparent, even though the financial sector’s contribution increased to about 5.5% during the years 
of the stock market boom’ (Detzer et al. 2013: 56).
18 Notice that ‘in 2010, albeit the experience of more than 3 years of financial crisis, the sector raised 
to 5.75%’. Furthermore, output of monetary and financial services (to GDP) increased quite sharply, 
as it ‘grew from around 5% in 1980 to around 9% in 2009’ (Consolandi et al. 2013: 26).
19 At first sight, the share of the financial sector in gross valued added shows a declining trend since 
mid-eighties. However, that figure could be misleading. The reason is ‘the methodological breaks that 
the series of the Spanish National Accounts, on which the figure is based, have suffered in the period 
analysed. However, data starting in the year 2000 have the same methodological basis and this is the 
most relevant period for Spain’s financialisation’ (Altuzarra et al. 2013: 57-59).
20 ‘Greek banks contribute to GDP more than the 85% of the whole sector’s value added’ (Argitis and 
Michopoulou 2013: 28).
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account ‘the weight of financial activities in total value added in Portugal was 
among the highest in the Euro Area in 2011, and its growth between 1995 
and 2011 was outstanding’ (Lagoa et al. 2013: 30-32). As we have mentioned 
already, the financial sector has grown sharply also in CEECs. For instance, 
‘value added in the financial sector almost doubled in Hungary relative to GDP 
after the fall of communism. The statistic as a proportion of GDP stands at 23 
percent in Hungary’ (see Szikszai et al. 2013: 46). As for Spain, the weight of 
the Spanish financial sector in the economy is still ‘somewhat less than the 
European average’. In 2007 ‘financial brokerage represented 5.3% of Gross 
Value Added in Spain (compared to 5.6% in EU)’ (Altuzarra et al. 2013: 23). 
However, from 2000 to 2009, ‘the share of the financial sector as a percent-
age of GDP increased by 41%, rising from 4.17% of GDP to 5.88% of GDP’. 
Noteworthy though it is, such an increase ‘is far from the increase registered in 
the size of the credit institutions systems, measured by the size of the assets 
and the liabilities as a percentage of the GDP’ (Altuzarra et al. 2013: 57-59). 
All in all, the data show a generalised increase in the share of value added 
of the financial sector to total value added in the last four decades. This is con-
sistent with the findings of Philippon and Reshef (2013) who argue that: first, 
‘finance’s share of income today is significantly higher than it has been during 
the last 150 years’; second, the overall trend is upward; third, while in Anglo-
Saxon countries and the Netherlands ‘finance continues to increase after the 
1980 [...] it seems that in other economies the financial sector’s income share 
reaches a plateau, and even declines somewhat’ (Philippon and Reshef 2013: 
74-75). In other words, financialisation has affected the process of creation 
and distribution of value added in each and every country, but it has been do-
ing so in different socially- and geographically-related forms.
Differences in cross-country levels and growth rates (of financial value add-
ed)  highlight the variegated impact of financialisation on national economic 
structures. However, this does not necessarily entail a growing weight of finance 
relative to other sectors.  The increasing dominance of finance over the ‘real 
economy’ can be seen by comparing the gross value added of each national 
financial sector with the gross value added of the corresponding manufacturing 
sector. Once again, both a general trend towards financialisation and cross-
country variegation are apparent. Figure 4 focuses on the six largest European 
economies by GDP. It shows that France, Italy and Spain are characterized by a 
remarkable increase in the relative weight of financial and insurance activities 
along with a small increase (or even a decrease, as in the case of France) of the 
value added of manufacturing sector. In both the UK and the Netherlands, the 
value added of the financial sector grows significantly. By contrast, the growth 
in Germany’s manufacturing sector is the same as the growth in financial and 
insurance activities in 1991-2012. In fact, if one restricts the analysis to the 
last fifteen years (and uses 1999 as the basis for index numbers), the rate 
of growth of the manufacturing sector turns out to be even higher than the 
growth rate of the financial sector. Finally, if we compare the gross value added 
of financial service activities with the gross value added of the manufacturing 
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sector, Spain, the UK and the Netherlands are the countries which have been 
most affected by financialisation. Not surprisingly, Germany is confirmed to be 
the least ‘financialised’ (or the most ‘industrialised’) economy. France and Italy 
represent a sort of middle ground, even though the increase in the value added 
of the financial sector is apparent in both countries.
FiGure 4: GroSS value added oF Financial Service activitieS and manuFacturinG Sector, reSpectively.
Source: Our elaboration on Eurostat statistics (October 2013).
5. Financial aSSetS to Gdp ratio
The trend in (gross) financial assets to GDP ratio is usually considered one 
of the key indicators of the process of financialisation. In some economies, 
such as Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Ireland, the financial assets to GDP 
ratio has recorded astronomical values in the last decade. Looking at major Eu-
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FIGURE 4. Gross value added of financial service activities and manufacturing sector, 
respectively. 
   
  
  
  
Source: our elaboration on Eurostat statistics (October 2013). 
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ropean economies, Germany is the one in which this ratio has historically been 
the highest, being around 7 times higher than GDP since the early 2000s (see 
Figure 5). In fact, the value of financial assets in the German economy ‘grew 
rapidly in the 1990s, both in absolute terms as well as relative to GDP. While in 
the 1980s the ratio of financial assets to GDP grew on average by 1.6% a year, 
this increased in the period from 1991 – 2000 to 6% a year’ (see Detzer et al. 
2013: 19). However, the growth in the value of Germany’s financial assets has 
been slower compared to those of other major economies and the UK’s ratio 
of financial assets to GDP has caught up (and overtaken) the German one since 
the mid-2000s.
FiGure 5: Financial aSSetS to Gdp ratioS in top-5 european economieS (leFt-hand chart, %) and 
itS trend Since 1995 (riGht-hand chart, index 1995 = 100).
Source: Our elaboration on OECD statistics (September 2013).
Notice also that the bulk of financial assets are owned by banks. Even in 
the case of the UK, bank assets alone ‘have grown fivefold (relative to GDP) 
since the 1970s; they were about 100% of GDP in the late 1970s, amount-
ing to 520% of GDP in 2010’ (Shabani et al. 2015: 117). In 2007, financial 
institutions as a whole controlled around 60% of financial assets in the Euro 
Area, compared to less than 20% in the US (see Altuzarra et al. 2013: 23).21 
Among major European economies, France and Italy are those with the lowest 
financial assets to GDP ratios, even though the French ratio has been boom-
ing in the last two decades. Besides, if one looks at the financial interrelations 
ratio,22 ‘in 1980 the Italian financial sector was not significantly different from 
the German and the Japanese cases’ (Consolandi et al. 2013: 24). This ratio 
21 In some countries that percentage was even higher (for instance, it amounted to 80% of financial 
assets in Spain, see Altuzarra et al. 2013: 23).
22 This ratio has been suggested by Goldsmith (1955). It is defined as the ratio of gross financial 
assets to real wealth.
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was 0.87 in Italy, 0.80 in Japan and 0.81 in Germany, whereas it was 1.35 in 
the UK, and 1.05 in both France and the US. Two decades later, ‘the values 
were 1.34 in Italy, 1.31 in Japan, 1.39 in Germany, 2.09 in the US and 2.86 
in the UK’ (ibid.), thereby confirming the last place of Italy in this ranking. As 
for Spain, the balance sheet of credit institutions (measured by the value of 
assets as a percentage of GDP) increased by 64.7% (Altuzarra et al. 2013: 57-
59) between 2000 and 2008. The total value of financial assets accounted for 
413%23 of GDP in 2007 and it remained rather high in the subsequent years 
as well (Altuzarra et al. 2013: 23).
Turning to the other economies of the Euro Area, the ratio of financial as-
sets to GDP was around 700 per cent in 2011 in Portugal. This was one of the 
highest percentages among European countries. The growth of financial assets 
in the period 1995-2010 was massive (around 140 percentage points) and 
similar to that of the EA17 (see Lagoa et al. 2013: 36-37). The Greek case is 
not that clear. It has been argued that ‘[m]onetary stability and banking liber-
alization made possible the rapid growth of capital and money markets in the 
1990s and the private non-banking financial assets were rapidly expanded 
during this period (from around 100% in 1987 to 300% in 1999)’ (Argitis 
and Michopoulou 2013: 135). Yet, OECD statistics reveal that Greece, along 
with Italy, is the European country with the lowest financial assets to GDP ra-
tio (113% in 2011). Finally, CEECs represent a middle ground. In particular, 
Estonia has been ‘one of the leaders [in terms of financial assets to GDP ra-
tios] among Baltic and CEE countries’ (Juuse and Kattel 2013: 26). In Estonia, 
the ratio of the banking system’s assets to GDP ‘doubled in eight years and 
reached 132% at the beginning of 2008 (whereas the ratio of financial sector 
as a whole exceeded 150%)’, mostly driven by ‘the expansion of the banks’ 
loan and leasing portfolio, which has led to a consistently increasing share of 
the loan portfolio in the structure of assets’ (Juuse and Kattel 2013: 35). In 
Poland ‘[t]he assets of the financial sector amounted to about 20% of GDP in 
1991, to about 50% in 1995, whereas in 2011 it already exceeded 120% of 
GDP’ (see Alfred et al. 2013: 8). To sum up, the financial assets to GDP ratio 
has increased remarkably in most European countries since the 1980s, though 
with some differences across countries. 
6. Final remarkS
Financialisation is a complex term, containing several different aspects. It 
may be seen as a phenomenon that has been more apparent in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, where the US and the UK are the most representative cases. But 
equally other nations and regions have been subject to processes of financiali-
sation. This can be seen in the context of the recent global crisis, as countries 
23 According to both OECD and Eurostat statistics, this percentage would be even higher (reaching 
almost 580% in 2007, and reducing to a slightly lower value in 2011).
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as diverse as Germany and the Baltic States have faced contagion from the 
upheaval in finance. The finance sectors in most EU countries more generally 
have become integrated, if unevenly in depth and breadth, into the global 
financial system, and they have experienced major changes in economic and 
social functioning as a result. The point is that financialisation is a systemic 
process, though one that is highly variegated across (and within) nations. The 
data reviewed in this paper seem to confirm this fact, as both average values 
of finance-related variables and their standard deviations have increased over 
time (see Table 1).
The FESSUD country reports, on which this paper draws, suggest that there 
has been a deep penetration of finance into a wide range of economic and so-
cial aspects in most European countries. The increasing dominance of finance 
over industry (reflected in the increasing value added of the financial sector 
to total value added) and the booming of the value of financial assets (linked 
to the multiplication of financial instruments) are clear signs of the process of 
financialisation. All in all, the data show a growing weight of the financial sec-
tor across countries since the 1980s, the only exception being the share of 
employment in the financial sector. In the aftermath of crisis, there is no sign 
that the importance of finance has been diminished. In fact, recovery in many 
table 1: croSS-country Sample Standard deviationS over time.
Variable
Sup-periods
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
Employment in Financial Sector 
to Total Empl. (%)*
-
3.74
[12.39]
3.76
[14.22]
3.81
[15.66]
Growth in Value Added of Finan-
cial Sector (%)
1.53
[2.05]
2.05
[5.13]
1.86
[3.09]
2.35
[3.56]
Value of Financial Assets to GDP 
(%)**
-
241.22
[323.61]
271.94
[384.49]
317.98
[482.23]
Source: Our elaboration on OECD statistics (September 2013).
Notes: Standard deviations calculated by using national (average) values for each sub-period; cross-
country average values are shown within square brackets; sample: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom, United States; * excluding Greece, Norway and US; ** excluding Norway and US.   
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countries has relied on some form of finance-led growth, suggesting that finan-
cialisation is a resilient process.
The UK, Ireland and the Benelux countries can be regarded as the strong-
holds of financialisation in the EU. The most notable exception is Germany. In 
spite of the noteworthy change in the structure of its banking sector, Germany 
can be still regarded as a manufacturing hub.24 This is reflected in the strength 
of Germany’s gross value added of the manufacturing sector as compared to 
the gross value added of the financial sector. France and Italy have followed 
a ‘middle ground’ pattern (meaning that the increase in financial value added 
and financial assets is apparent there, but it has not been as sharp as the one 
registered in Anglo-Saxon Benelux countries). The same goes for the other 
early-members of the EU. For instance, in the decade preceding the European 
sovereign debt crisis, Spain has been marked by a sharp increase in the value 
of financial assets in the economy. At the same time, the financialisation pro-
cess in Spain has come with the maintenance of the traditional structure of the 
banking sector, as well as with a quite stable share in total employment and in 
total gross value added. CEECs, in contrast, have gone through a pronounced 
financialisation process. This dynamic might well prefigure a catching-up pro-
cess with developed economies. However, the absolute degree of financialisa-
tion of CEECs is still low compared to that of the early-members of the EU. 
24 This is reflected in the balance of payments of the two countries. The UK runs deficits in the current 
account of the balance of payment since 1984. By contrast, Germany runs current account surpluses 
since the mid-1980s, except for the ‘unification’ period (see Shabani et al. 2015, and Detzer et al. 
2013)
table 2: relative trendS in the extent oF Financial Sector Since the early 1990S.
Variable
Trend
Decrease Stable or variable
Moderate 
increase
Boom
Employment in Financial 
Sector to Total Empl.
Germany, 
Romania
Greece*, Portu-
gal*, Spain, Italy, 
France
UK, Sweden
CEECs (except 
for Romania)
Growth in value Added 
of Financial Sector 
Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Finland, 
France
Spain, Portu-
gal, Greece
UK, Nether-
lands, Poland, 
Ireland; CEECs
Value of Financial Assets 
to GDP
Germany, 
Italy, France, 
Greece, 
CEECs
Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, 
Ireland, UK, 
Portugal
Source: OECD, Eurostat and FESSUD country reports (2013).
Notes: * data start from 1997.
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These findings are summarised in Table 2 and are consistent with the idea 
that an uneven and variegated (as opposed to smooth and uniform) financiali-
sation process has been taking place. This is a specific application of the idea 
of ‘variegated capitalism’ (Peck and Theodore, 2007). Variegated financialisa-
tion captures two key things. One is the idea of financialisation as a systemic 
process operating within and across nations. The other is the idea of financiali-
sation as a variegated process – how it unfolds within and impacts upon par-
ticular nations and regions is mediated by the institutions, politics, and culture 
of those nations and regions. It captures, in other words, the differences in 
the process of financialisation as it develops and is developed across diverse 
nation states and regions, and across diverse systems of provision, while recog-
nising at the same time that there is a common process of financialisation con-
necting this diversity at a global level. The idea of variegated financialisation is 
in our view supported by the data reviewed in this paper (for a range of views 
including opposition to that presented here see IJPE 2013).
As mentioned above, while there are differences between countries in term 
of the nature, extent and depth of the financialisation process, there are some 
clear common features to the above process across nations. That is, there is 
variegation in the financialisation process which data are able to draw out. To 
sum up, EU countries have gone through a process of financialisation in the 
last three decades. This process has affected their economic and social struc-
tures, materialising in different historically- and geographically-related forms. 
The task for future research (and one undertaken by the FESSUD project) is to 
develop and substantiate conceptually as well as empirically and methodo-
logically the notion of variegated financialisation. This entails, for example, 
examining the diverse ways in which specific systems of provision (e.g. of water, 
of housing, etc.) are being financialised across the globe.
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